The real estate market bubble and the subprime mortgages have been often identified as the causes of the current financial crisis, but this is not entirely true or, at least, they cannot be considered as the main cause. A poor regulatory framework based on the belief that banks could be trusted to regulate themselves is among the main sources of the crisis. At the same time, risk management at most banking institutions has failed to enforce the basic rules for a safe business: i.e., avoid strong concentrations and minimize volatility of returns. The purpose of this study is to identify the reasons behind the risk management failure and offer a view on how they can be solved or improved going forward if we want to ensure a sounder financial system than today's one. In particular, I examine the following issues: 1) lack of a defined capital allocation strategy, 2) disaggregated vision of risks and 3) inappropriate risk governance structure.
INTRODUCTION
When examining the causes for the financial crisis, most people start directly with the real estate market focusing on the subprime mortgages and unscrupulous lenders and casting the blame on the unsustainable real estate bubble which began to collapse in 2006. Whereas this is true, it is not the whole story. A poor regulatory framework based on the belief that banks could be trusted to regulate themselves is, in my opinion, among the main sources of the crisis. It is quite obvious that regulators across the world have not efficiently monitored the risk management functions of most banks.
At the same time, risk management at most banking institutions has failed to enforce the basic rules for a safe business: i.e., avoid strong concentrations and minimize volatility of returns. Several excuses have been presented to hide this failure (e.g. limited role of risk management, inability to influence business decisions, incapacity of forecasting such a severe crisis, etc). Although some of these excuses may be partially true for some institutions, however I am convinced that the risk management function has clearly shown its significant weaknesses and failures.
The purpose of this study is to identify the reasons behind the failure of risk management and offer a view on how they can be solved or improved going forward if we want to ensure a sounder financial system than today's one. In particular, I examine the following issues: 1) lack of a defined capital allocation strategy, 2) disaggregated vision of risks and 3) inappropriate risk governance structure.
Most banks used to grow their lending portfolios driven by market demand without a clear capital allocation strategy. Regulatory pressures, such as Basel II and a greater 3 focus on corporate governance, have been a stimulus for many changes in the industry.
One of these has been the recognition of the need to articulate risk appetite more clearly.
Risk appetite translates risk metrics and methods into business decisions, reporting and day-to-day business discussions. It sets the boundaries which form a dynamic link between strategy, target setting and risk management.
Articulating risk appetite is a complex task which requires the balancing of many views.
Some elements can be quantified, but ultimately it is a question of judgment. A bank with a well defined risk appetite framework will provide internal senior management and external stakeholders with a clear picture of where it currently stands and how it wants to grow in terms of concentration and expected returns of its assets. In Section 2, I investigate how banks should define their risk appetite and how it should be used to facilitate better risk management practices and capital allocation strategies.
Although many institutions, particularly the large national and international financial institutions, have already adopted Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) approaches, others are still using reactive rather than proactive methods of risk monitoring and detection. Typically, these methods are the traditional silo approaches to risk management and are rapidly becoming insufficient in preventing increasingly diversified risks (especially credit, market and operational risks). Silo-based approaches are reactive and their functions segregated; each silo has its own tools and applications to assist with specific management and reporting requirements. Problems arise because these independent systems do not communicate with one another and across business lines.
A silo-view of risks is still a common practice at most banks and this does not allow senior management to have a full picture of risk concentrations and correlations. Similar assets, or assets with a high correlation between them, can seat in different books (e.g. credit and trading book) or off-balance and their risk may never be aggregated causing a significant understatement of the capital needed. I will expand on this subject in Section 3 providing a view of what should be the minimum level of risk aggregation that would ensure avoiding "hidden correlations".
Last, in Section 4, I analyze the current risk governance structure often in place at most banks in order to understand where the weaknesses are and how they can be addressed.
This topic is extremely correlated with the previous ones. Only a clear, well-organized risk structure will be able to provide enterprise-wide risk measures and aggregate risks appropriately before reporting them to the CRO and ultimately to the Board.
The risk function reporting lines have been underestimated for long time in the wrong belief that a good risk manager would be able to influence business decision providing a good set of analyses even without a clear authority to do that. This is definitely not true and the current crisis is an example of what can happen when the role of risk management is underestimated within a financial organization. In Section 5, I draw my conclusions.
CAPITAL ALLOCATION STRATEGY
Portfolio selection strategies have been a major topic in the literature during the last 60 years and especially after the well known Markowits' article (1952) . However, few 5 studies have analyzed how to apply these strategies to banks. This may seem strange considering that banks are among the main investors in the financial markets, but the reasons can be found in several banks' peculiarities that can have distracted the attention from them.
First, capital was considered to be cheap and easy to raise for banking organizations, at least until recently. This created the belief that every deal that looked profitable could be done letting the market demand to drive the asset growth.
Second, banking organizations were also considered to have a social function providing funds to companies in order to start or grow their business and to consumers in order to buy homes or goods. This social function was considered to be prevailing in the capital allocation strategy. However, particularly in the last 20 years, shareholders have clearly indicated their vision of bank as a profit-making institution. As such, in order to please shareholders and to outperform peers, banking CEOs have aggressively invested in complex assets mixing their traditional lending culture with a more speculative equity one 1 .
The business model for banking institutions moved towards an equity culture with a focus on faster share price growth and earnings expansion during the 1990s. The previous model, based on balance sheets and old fashioned spreads on loans, was not conducive to banks becoming "growth stocks". So, the strategy switched more towards activity based on trading income and fees via securitization which enabled banks to 6 grow earnings while at the same time economizing on capital by gaming the Basel system.
In implementing this cultural change, most banks focused mainly on the expected return side of their investment leaving the risk side out. Concentrations in highly correlated assets have significantly increased without any consideration of the volatility of their losses. Portfolio diversification became a purely theoretical concept easy to be sacrificed to allow the market share to grow. Pricing was mainly set to be competitive in the market and not to guarantee an appropriate return.
Hopefully, the current financial crisis will provide banks with the right incentives to correct all mentioned shortfalls, but in order to achieve this it will be essential to have a well defined and fully embedded risk appetite strategy ensuring that accepted risks and rewards are aligned with shareholders' expectations.
There is no literature describing how to define risk appetite for a bank and it is for this reason that I am often referring to Markowitz (1952) portfolio selection theory. In this study, Markowitz explains how to build the most efficient investment portfolio finding the right balance between expected returns and volatility of losses. He demonstrates that diversification is the best tool to reduce the risk of the entire portfolio. The concept is easily applicable to banks portfolios.
Clearly, the risk function of a financial institution cannot define a risk appetite framework by itself, but will need the help of the business (sales) department to model the expected returns. Only if risk and business people join their efforts, it will be possible to articulate a consistent and effective risk appetite framework. Moreover, a top-down approach needs to be used. Ultimately, the Board, interpreting shareholders views, is expected to draw the way forward in terms of acceptable risks and required returns. Then, following these guidelines, the risk and the business functions will define risk appetite at different levels (e.g. group, divisional and portfolio level).
A good risk appetite framework should consist of two parts: the first should present a picture of the current situation 2 . This should provide clarity on how capital is currently allocated between portfolios, what are the main concentrations and which portfolios are below the expected minimum return. In order to take this picture, we need first to define the metrics to be used.
Following Markowitz (1952) , I use the standard deviation of the losses (σ) and the return on equity (ROE) for each portfolio 3 . If we imagine a bank that offers 3 products (e.g. mortgages (P1), credit cards (P2) and SME loans (P3)), we can draw them into the picture using "bubbles" of different sizes indicating how much capital is allocated in each portfolio (see Figure 1 ). Ultimately, banks will need to take at least three pictures in order to have a full view: i.e. at group, division and portfolio level. Once the pictures are taken, we can focus on the second part building the framework in. increase, decrease or keep growth stable) (see Figure 2 ).
As I mentioned before, the size of the "bubbles" in the graph represents the concentration in the specific product, portfolio, sector or country, depending on the level I am defining the risk appetite (Group, division or portfolio) and on the kind of assets (retail or wholesale) considered. Several metrics can be used to define the "bubble" size: e.g. balance, Risk Weighted Assets (RWA), Economic Capital (EC). The choice will depend on the level of sophistication that the bank has reached to measure the allocated capital. picture. As such, portfolios can be classified into red/amber/green. The following step will consist in defining the mitigating actions to be implemented in order to move portfolios at desired levels of returns and volatility.
The risk appetite framework should describe how the capital allocation strategy should change when portfolios end up in the red or amber area, but it should not set the specific concentration limits for each product, portfolio, country or sector. These should be set in a limit concentration framework using a top-down approach. Also in this case, the Board should drive the process providing high level statements to be translated at divisional and portfolio level by the risk and business functions 4 .
Once the risk appetite framework is fully embedded, it forces the debate and helps ensure that risks are made explicit. To change behaviours in relation to risk, interventions through additional training or changing personnel may be needed, but in most organizations the tone set by senior management tends to have by far the greatest impact. Risk appetite is not only a framework, but a deep cultural change that will ensure banks to be more solid in the next future. ERM is a rigorous approach to assessing and addressing the risks from all sources that threaten the achievement of an organization's strategic objectives. A well-implemented ERM approach should be able to provide a comprehensive and coherent view of the risks that an institution is facing allowing senior management to focus on the full picture and not on the single "silo".
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT
Following the relevant literature, we can identify "pure" risks (or hazard risks) and speculative risks 6 . While the former can only generate a loss, with the latter there is also the possibility of a gain. Traditional risk management used to focus on pure risks until financial risk management became predominant in the '80s developing specific tools, techniques and terms. In today's environment, the aggregation of these two different types of risks is definitely the main challenge that financial institutions willing to implement an ERM approach need to face. However, an ERM report that would focus only on financial risks would not be fulfilling its scope and would leave out some potential source of loss or value destruction.
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The first step in operationalizing ERM is to identify the risks the firm is exposed to. A common approach is to identify the types of risks that will be measured. Early on, financial institutions focused on market and credit risks. Eventually, operational risk was added. For such an approach to capture all the risks the firm is exposed to, operational risk has to include all the risks that are not market and credit risks. For banks, the definition of operational risk that is used by the new Basel Accord is much narrower, e.g., it ignores reputational risks 7 . Consequently, there will be a tension between measurement of operational risk for regulatory purposes and measurement of operational risk from the perspective of ERM. Many firms have gone beyond measuring market, credit, and operational risks. In particular, in recent years, firms have also attempted to measure liquidity, reputation, tax, pension and strategic risks.
If a firm follows the approach of classifying risks into market, credit, and operational risks, or uses a different typology that is more appropriate to its business, it then has to identify and measure how it is exposed to these various risks. This requires the identification and measurement of the exposures across the firm using common approaches. For an inventory of risks within an organization to be useful, it is necessary for all the information to be collected, made comparable, and updated.
Organizations that have grown through acquisitions or without centralized IT departments typically face the problem that they have some systems that are not Ideally, a good ERM framework should be able to summarize all risks into one number:
i.e., the optimal level of available capital. A firm that practices ERM may therefore have an amount of capital that substantially exceeds its regulatory requirements because it maximizes shareholder wealth by doing so. In this case, the regulatory requirements are not binding and would not affect the firm's decisions. The firm could be in a more difficult situation if its required regulatory capital exceeds the amount of capital it should hold to maximize shareholder wealth. Regulatory capital for banks is generally defined in terms of regulatory accounting. For ERM, banks should focus on economic
capital. An exclusive focus on regulatory capital is likely to be mistaken since it does not reflect correctly the buffer stock of equity available.
In summary, how to aggregate different risks remains the main challenge for all firms willing to implement an ERM approach and for banks in particular. At most banks, IT systems are still unable to dialogue between them and the methodologies used to evaluate risks are so different that it is almost impossible to reconcile them in one single number. Ignoring these main issues providing ERM reports that address risks "by silos"
is useless and dangerous. It may take some time to build the right infostructure to implement an ERM framework, but financial institutions should be convinced that this is the best way to avoid mistakes as the ones that generated the current crisis.
RISK GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
The lack of an appropriate risk governance structure would dissolve any benefit generated by a first class risk management team. This argument has been used several times during the current crisis by risk managers as an excuse to justify their failures.
However, it is true that the role of risk management was extremely marginal at most institutions, leaving the ability of influencing business decisions to the persuasion's skills of each risk manager and not to his authority.
Several articles and books have been written on how to influence without authority 8 .
This is definitely an important topic for today's leaders that need to face flatter structures, globalization and cross-functional teams. However, due to the fact that most of the risk managers' work is based on uncertain forecasts and hypothetic scenarios, it can be quite easy to challenge the assumptions behind risk management proposals.
The Chief Risk Officer (CRO) is still not seating in the Board of most banks and the country risk managers have often only dotted reporting lines to him and solid ones to business heads. This kind of risk structure has clearly proved not to be appropriate precluding the possibility for risk to raise its voice when needed. The independence of the risk function must be ensured at all banks and supervisory authority will need to continuously monitor on this.
On the other side, as mentioned before in the article, empowering risk management and ensuring its independence will not solve all problems if the quality of the function does not improve accordingly. Senior management will need to drive the improvement towards a more effective and efficient role of risk, increasing substantially their involvement in daily decisions and ensuring the stability and soundness of all processes.
The Board will need to pay more attention to risk in general, approving and monitoring the respect of the risk appetite framework through a good ERM reporting.
CROs are expected to facilitate the change of the culture in the Board and in the whole bank helped by the risk staff. Probably, this is not going to be an easy process or a fast one, but it is probably the only way to ensure the respect and the independence of the risk function going forward.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I analyze what I believe to be the three most significant failures of risk management at most banks: 1) lack of a defined capital allocation strategy, 2) disaggregated vision of risks and 3) inappropriate risk governance structure. These issues were never addressed properly or at all by banks and became clearly visible at the moment the current economic crisis began.
I suggest that a capital allocation strategy should be thoroughly defined for the short and long term using a risk appetite framework. This should specify the bank's risk capacity (maximum risk tolerance) and risk appetite (desired risk tolerance) following the guidelines proposed by the Board. Metrics should be defined based on the commonly used portfolio selection strategies in terms of expected returns and volatility of losses.
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Concentration limits should be imposed with a top-down approach and monitored through the risk appetite reports.
Designing and embedding a good risk appetite framework is the only way for banks to provide clarity to internal and external stakeholders regarding the way they want to grow their assets. Risk and Business need to work together to create a new, more conscious risk culture within financial organizations.
In this work, I also point out that the way risks have been aggregated and reported so far is not optimal. A substantial amount of literature explores how banks can implement an Enterprise Risk Management framework, but few banks have tried to implement it and even less have been successful. IT systems for different risks that cannot share information and the lack of methodology to make them comparable are among the main issues related to this failure.
Implementing a sound ERM approach to monitor and report risks is going to be the main challenge for banks in the next future. Large investments in infostructure will be needed if financial institutions are willing to succeed. However, in the long run, benefits are likely to significantly overcome costs.
Last, I argue that the risk governance structure may have also played a fundamental role in the failure of risk management practices at most banks. Weak reporting lines and lack of visibility of the CRO at Board level are, in my opinion, the main issues that should be solved in order to ensure the independence of the risk function.
Eventually, the list of issues that I have analyzed in this article may not be comprehensive, but it definitely presents a good starting point for banks that want to use
